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Abstract
Priors in which a large number of parameters are specified to be indepen-
dent are dangerous; they make it hard to learn from data. I present a couple
of examples from the literature and work through a bit of large sample theory
to show what happens.
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1 Introduction
Be´lisle et al. (2002) fit five interesting models to a data set on progression
of Alzheimer’s disease. They use Bayes factors (both prior and posterior)
for model selection. Most of the Bayes factors reported are numbers of the
form 10x with x on the order of plus or minus tens to hundreds; that is, in
most cases when two models are compared one of the two is overwhelmingly
preferred. This is not too surprising from a Bayes perspective but the results
reveal some comparisons which are surprising for a frequentist.
In some of these models there is a parameter which varies from individual
to individual. In other models this parameter is constant across individuals.
For a frequentist the latter model is a submodel of the former. A frequentist
would, I submit, be surprised to be told that in the face of the data the
submodel is overwhelmingly (like 1012 time more likely) to be preferred to
the richer model. In the results presented by Be´lisle et al. (2002) this is
exactly what happens: their model 5 is strongly preferred to their model 4 of
1The author thanks Michael Stephens for many useful conversations on the topics
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which model 5 is a submodel. They report prior Bayes factors of 1022.7 and
1012 in favour of the submodel in two different data sets. They also compute
posterior Bayes factors, known to be computationally easier, of 1026.5 and
1016.3 in favour of the submodel in the same two datasets.
Their modelling suggests, in fact, that neither of these models is as good
as their models 1, 2 or 3 which are more complex. It seems nevertheless
worthwhile to understand the potential for Bayes factors strongly to prefer
submodels to full models. In this note I use the one way layout model to
give an example in which a wrong submodel is overwhelmingly preferred to
the full model.
Priors in which a large number of parameters are specified as being in-
dependent can easily cause problems. For a second example I consider a
stylized survey sampling problem rom Wasserman (2004) who presents it as
a problem in which Bayes methods struggle.
In Section 2 I present the mathematical details of the one way layout prob-
lem and discuss briefly the relation to the situation in Be´lisle et al. (2002). In
Section 3 I simplify Wasserman’s problem and present the standard Bayesian
analysis. I finish the paper with a short discussion arguing that
1. Priors in which many parameters are independent can be too informa-
tive to be safely used in data analysis.
2. Hierarchical priors, as Bayesians know well, avoid these pitfalls.
3. In order to learn from what happens in one measurement about another
measurement a Bayesian must, before making the first measurement,
regard the two outcomes as dependent.
I hope the examples here might be useful for pedagogy and for highlight-
ing dangers of careless use of priors.
2 Example 1: the one way layout
Consider the k sample problem with known variance. We suppose we have
data Xij; j = 1, . . . , ni; i = 1, . . . , k. We will be considering the standard
analysis of variance model. We assume the Xij to be independent with Xij
having a normal distribution with mean µi and variance 1. This will be
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Model 1. Model 2 is the nested submodel with all µi = 0; that is, for Model
2 the data are iid standard normal.
This is usually treated by frequentists as a hypothesis testing problem
but we will look at it here as a model selection problem. We will consider
a Bayesian approach. Conditional on Model 2 holding there are no further
parameters on which to put a prior distribution. Conditional on Model 1
holding we need a prior for the µi. We consider the simple conjugate prior
under which the means µi are independent N(0, τ
2) random variables.
If the 2 models are given prior probabilities pi1 and pi2 = 1− pi1 then the
posterior probability that model 2 holds given the data is
pi2
pi1 + pi2F
where F is the prior Bayes factor given by
F =
f2(x)
f1(x)
with fi being the marginal density of the data under model i. (That is, f1 is
the model joint density averaged with respect to the prior on the µi and f2
is the joint density of iid standard normals.)
Elementary normal distribution theory calculations show that
f1(x) = (2pi)
−n/2
k∏
i=1
(1 + niτ
2)−1/2 exp
−12
∑
ij
x2ij +
τ 2
∑
i
(∑
j xij
)2
2(1 + niτ 2)

where we let x be the vector of all the xij values. It follows that
log(F ) = −
∑
i
τ 2
(∑
j Xij
)2
2(1 + niτ 2)
+
1
2
∑
i
log(1 + niτ
2).
Now we want to consider the frequentist properties of log(F ) by imagining a
sequence µ1, µ2, . . .. I will take these values to be deterministic and try to see
how log(F ) behaves when there are many samples, that is, when k is large.
I begin by computing the first few moments of log(F ). For simplicity I will
take all the ni to be equal and use n to denote their common value. In this
case, for each i we find that
Ti ≡
∑
j
Xij ∼ Normal(nµi, n)
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and these sums, Ti, are independent over i. Thus
E
(
T 2i
)
= n+ n2µ2i .
Thus the mean of log(F ) is
E [log(F )] = − τ
2
2(1 + nτ 2)
(
nk + n2
∑
i
µ2i
)
+
1
2
k log(1 + nτ 2).
We can now check that if µ2 =
∑
i µ
2
i /k is small enough then log(F )
can easily be positive. A simpler computation ensues if the µi are in fact
generated in an iid way from a Normal(0, 2) distribution; I now make this
assumption. Then holding n and τ fixed and letting k, the number of samples,
tend to ∞, we see that
2
log(F )
k
→ log(1 + a)− a(1 + n
2)
1 + a
where a = nτ 2. Define f(a) = log(1 +a)−a/(1 +a) and check that f(0) = 0
and f ′(a) = a/(1 + a)2 > 0. The term an2/(1 + a) is no more than n2
which converges to 0 as  → 0. So for each n, τ pair there is an  so small
that the limit of 2 log(F )/k is positive. For this sequence — a sequence for
which the null hypothesis is clearly false — the Bayes factor in favour of the
null model, grows exponentially fast. If n = 10 and τ = 1, for instance,
then a = 10. Numerically we find that with  = 0.3 the limit of log(F )/k is
0.67 ≈ 2/3. In other words if the actual variability in the means is 30% of
the variability predicted by the prior then the submodel is roughly exp(2k/3)
times as credible as the full model.
A reasonable form of the analytic law of log(F ) is available when the µi
are iid N(0, 2). In this case
Ti = nµi +
∑
j
(Xij − µi)
has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ2 = n22 + n.
Since the Ti are iid it follows that∑
i
T 2i /σ
2 ∼ χ2k.
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Thus
log(F ) = k log(1 + nτ 2)/2− τ 2σ2
∑
i
T 2i /σ
2
so that
P (log(F ) > kt) = P
[
χ2k
k
> (1 + nτ 2)
2t− log(1 + nτ 2)
σ2τ 2
]
Using this form I plot, in Figure 2, the median of F against the number k of
samples for n = 10, τ = 1 and  = 0.3. I use a logarithmic scale for F on the
y-axis and the nearly perfect linearity is evident. Note, too, that the actual
median values are very large by the time k = 50 and vast for k = 200.
The situation here is relatively simple. In the model above the value of
µi is estimated from 10 observations. The prior specified iid µi with variance
1 so that the standard deviation of the µi arising was a priori expected to be
1. In fact that standard deviation was smaller, 0.3 only. As a consequence
when k is moderately large the prior for Model 1, the less restrictive model,
is contradicted for the data. Model 2 is also contradicted (and false). For
 < 0.404 or so, as k → ∞ with n and tau held fixed, we find that F tends
exponentially fast to ∞ and we erroneously conclude that the means are all
0.
In Be´lisle et al. (2002), Model 5 differs from Model 4 in allowing a certain
variance parameter to be different from subject to subject. These variance
parameters were taken to be independent across individuals and to have
expectation 2; they were given inverse Gaussian distributions with this ex-
pectation and with standard deviation 2. There were n = 65 subjects in one
of the two data sets and n = 55 in the other. I do not have access to the data
(honestly, I haven’t tried to get access to the data) so I cannot check, but I
assume that it is likely that a fit with some smaller mean and or some other
standard deviation for these variance parameters would yield more natural
Bayes factors.
The phenonemon described above arises in other model selection prob-
lems. For instance, we regress Y on p predictors X1, . . . , Xp and assume that
each Xi has a non-zero coefficient independently of all the other covariates
and that θ ∈ (0, 1) is the common value then if we do model selection by
Bayesian methods the posterior will be concentrated on the event that the
number of active predictors is in the range pθ ± 2√pθ(1− θ).
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Figure 1: The median of F is plotted against the number k of samples for
n = 10, τ = 1 and  = 0.3. Note the logarithmic scale on the vertical axis.
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3 Example 2: Survey Sampling
A related phenomenon occurs in Larry Wasserman’s book All of Statistics.
Example 11.19 in the book is a description of a missing data problem but it
has the flavour of survey sampling. There are B parameters θ1, . . . , θB, each
a probability in [0, 1]. We draw a sample with replacement from the index
set {1, · · · , B}; let X1, . . . , Xn be the indices selected. It is assumed that
these are iid and uniform on {1, · · · , B}. Having selected, on the ith draw,
unit Xi, we may or may not observe an observation Yi which is Bernoulli
with parameter θXi . The example given supposes that ‘may or may not’ is
determined by a Bernoulli variable Ri with parameter ξXi which is known to
the analyst. In the text it is argued that the Horwitz-Thompson estimator
of
ψB ≡
∑B
1 θj
B
is a good one and that Bayesian methods fail. Here I simplify the model,
eliminating the possibility of missing data and make the sampling law a bit
more in line with survey sampling work.
I will assume that we generate a set J , the sample, of indices in {1, . . . , B}
with design probability piJ ; I assume the design is not informative; that is
the piJ are known to the surveyor in advance and unrelated to ψ. Then for
each j ∈ J we observe Yj with a Bernoulli(θj) distribution independently of
all other Y values. I let Y denote the vector of J observed values.
The likelihood is the probability of observing the data we observed:
piJ
∏
j∈J
θ
Yj
j (1− θj)1−Yi .
This likelihood is observed to depend on only n of the B entries in the
vector θ of all θi. Wasserman now argues that “for most θj the posterior
distribution is equal to the prior distribution since those θj do not appear
in the likelihood.” The problem, however, is that the prior is not clearly
specified. If I specify that the θi are a priori iid with density pi(·) then the
posterior for unobserved θi is still iid with density pi(·). This appears to me
to be the argument intended by Wasserman. But this prior specifies that if I
measure one θi I do not learn about any other θi. This sort of prior is exactly
the sort discussed above and has the same weakness. The unobserved B− n
parameters θj will average, essentially, to ψ ≡
∫ 1
0
θpi(θ)dθ. If, as the text
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assumes, B − n is very large compared to n then of course I will not learn
anything important about ψB; a priori I knew that ψB was close to ψ.
I would argue that the correct message here is as above; independence
priors about many parameters are priors which deny learning. If I had to
guess the mass of a flea I would struggle but if you let me weigh one of a
group of many I would suddenly know far more about the average weight of
the group of fleas. I need a hierarchical prior.
In the Wasserman example (as modified here) one might specify such a
hierarchical prior by taking the θi to be iid with a Beta(α, β) distribution and
then putting a prior on (α, β) ∈ (0,∞)2. For the discussion which follows I
reparametrize the Beta distribution in terms of its mean
ψ =
α
α + β
and its variance
η ≡ ψ(1− ψ)
α + β + 1
.
The parameters α and β may be expressed in terms of ψ and η by noting
α + β =
ψ(1− ψ)
η
− 1
and
α = (α + β)ψ =
ψ2(1− ψ)
η
− ψ
This gives
β =
ψ(1− ψ)
η
− 1− (ψ
2(1− ψ)
η
− ψ) = (1− ψ)(ψ − ψ
2 − η)
η
.
A simple prior specification might then be to give ψ some Beta(α0, β0)
density denoted h0(ψ) on [0, 1] and to give η some conditional density given
ψ. Notice that 0 ≤ η ≤ ψ(1 − ψ) so this conditional density must be
supported on this interval. One simple conditional prior would be to take η
to be uniform on [0, ψ∞(1− ψ∞)]; I use h(η|ψ) for some generic conditional
prior for η given ψ and then specialize where needed to the uniform case
where
h(η|ψ) = 1 (0 ≤ η ≤ ψ(1− ψ))
ψ(1− ψ) .
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A priori we have E (ψB|ψ, η) = ψ.
The joint law of the data, the parameters θi and the hyperparameters ψ
and η is
piJ
∏
j∈J
θ
Yj
j (1− θj)1−Yj
∏
j
θα−1j (1− θj)β−1
Beta(α, β)
h(η|ψ)h0(ψ). (1)
From this I now deduce: the joint law of the data J, Y and the hyperparam-
eters ψ and η; the usual Bayes estimate of ψ, namely E(ψ|Y ); and the Bayes
estimate of ψB, namely E(ψB|Y ).
For the first of these I simply integrate away all the θj. For j 6∈ J we have∫ 1
0
θα−1j (1− θj)β−1
Beta(α, β)
dθj = 1.
For j ∈ J the integral needed becomes∫ 1
0
θ
Yj
j (1− θj)1−Yj
θα−1j (1− θj)β−1
Beta(α, β)
dθj =
Beta(α + Yj, β + 1− Yj)
Beta(α, β)
.
Considering the two cases Yj = 1 and Yj = 0 separately we find∫ 1
0
θ
Yj
j (1− θj)1−Yj
θα−1j (1− θj)β−1
Beta(α, β)
dθj = ψ
Yj(1− ψ)1−Yj .
Thus the joint law of J, Y, ψ, η is
piJ
∏
j∈J
ψYj (1− ψ)1−Yjh(η|ψ) = piJψS(1− ψ)|J |−Sh(η|ψ)h0(ψ)
where S =
∑
J Yj and we use |J | to denote the cardinality of J .
The conditional density, f(ψ, η|Y, J), of ψ, η given Y and J is then
ψS(1− ψ)|J |−Sh(η|ψ)
Beta(S + 1, |J | − S + 1) .
Now integrate out η to find the conditional density of ψ given Y and J ,
namely,
ψS(1− ψ)|J |−S
B(S + 1, |J | − S + 1)h0(ψ).
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If h0 is the Beta(α0, β0) then this posterior is a Beta density; the Bayes
estimate of ψ is the mean of this density, namely,
ψˆ =
S + α0
|J |+ α0 + β0
I remark that the improper prior ψ−1(1 − ψ)−1 arises in the limit α0 → 0
and β0 → 0. This leads to the Horwitz-Thompson estimator
ψˆHT =
S
|J |
suggested by Wasserman. Of course this is our estimate of ψ while Wasser-
man is estimating ψB.
Finally I compute the Bayes estimate of ψB which is
E(ψB|Y, J) = 1
B
∑
j
E(θj|Y, J).
I compute E(θj|Y ) separately according to j 6∈ J or j ∈ J .
Notice that
E(θj|Y, J) = E {E (θj|Y, J, ψ, η) |Y, J} .
In order to compute the inside conditional expectation I return to joint
law (1). For j 6∈ J this joint law may be written in the form
θα−1j (1− θj)β−1
Beta(α, β)
× C
where the quantity C does not depend on θj. It follows that given Y, J, ψ, η
the conditional law of θj is, for j 6∈ J , Beta with parameters ψ and η. Thus
E(θj|Y, J, ψ, η) = ψ.
Finally we see that
E(θj|Y, J) = E(ψ|Y, J) = ψˆ.
When j ∈ J the kernel of (1) is
θ
α+Yj−1
j (1− θj)β+1−Yj+1
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which is the kernel of the Beta density with parameters α+Yj and β+1−Yj.
The mean of this density is
α + Yj
α + β + 1
and we need to compute
E {E (θj|Y, J, ψ, η) |Y, J}
This is ∫
E (θj|Y, J, ψ, η)h(η|ψ)f(ψ|Y, J)dηdψ.
The required conditional density is given above but we must write the inner
conditional mean in terms of ψ and η. First we get
α
α + β + 1
= ψ(α+β)
η
ψ(1− ψ) = ψ
{
ψ(1− ψ)
η
− 1
}
η
ψ(1− ψ) = ψ−
η
1− ψ.
We also find
Yj
α + β + 1
= Yj
η
ψ(1− ψ) .
Our integral becomes∫ ∫ (
ψ − η
1− ψ + Yj
η
ψ(1− ψ)
)
f(ψ, η|Y, J)dηdψ.
I now use the conditional uniform distribution of η to do the inside integral
to get ∫ (
ψ − ψ
2
+
Yj
2
)
f(ψ|Y, J)dψ = ψˆ + Yj − ψˆ
2
.
In summary we have found that
E(θj|Y, J) =
{
ψˆ j 6∈ J
ψˆ +
Yj−ψˆ
2
j ∈ J .
From this we find that the Bayes estimate of ψ is
ψˆ − |J |ψˆ + S
2B
= ψˆ +
|J |
B
ψˆHT − ψˆ
2
.
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When |J | is small compared to B the second term is negligible. In fact, for the
special choice of the non-informative improper prior ψ−1(1−ψ)−1 the second
term vanishes exactly and the Bayes estimate is just the Horvitz-Thompson
estimator. Finally remark that the second term is
|J |
2B
{
S + α0
|J |+ α0 + β0 −
S
|J |
}
=
(S + α0)|J | − S(|J |+ α0 + β0)
2B(|J |+ α0 + β0) .
This quantity is easily seen to be bounded, in absolute value, by
α0/2
B
+
(α0 + β0)/2
B
= O(1/B).
Thus the correction to ψˆ is negligible if B is large.
As a practical matter this Horvitz-Thompson has variance which is ac-
ceptably small. Treating the θj as fixed parameters the variance is∑
J
θi(1− θj)/|J |2.
I do not think this quantity admits a useful estimate.
4 Discussion
When many parameters are specified as a priori independent, the prior is
very informative about averages of functions of those parameters. The result
is that estimates can depend little on the data and model selection methods
can have very poor frequency theory properties. Analysts using Bayesian
methods must be careful of such priors and ought, in many cases, to make
the prior hierarchical, inducing dependence between the parameters and per-
mitting learning about some parameters by measuring others.
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